| 5283962e | 31-Jan-2019 |
Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com> |
Add ARMv8.3-PAuth registers to CPU context
ARMv8.3-PAuth adds functionality that supports address authentication of the contents of a register before that register is used as the target of an indire
Add ARMv8.3-PAuth registers to CPU context
ARMv8.3-PAuth adds functionality that supports address authentication of the contents of a register before that register is used as the target of an indirect branch, or as a load.
This feature is supported only in AArch64 state.
This feature is mandatory in ARMv8.3 implementations.
This feature adds several registers to EL1. A new option called CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS has been added to select if the TF needs to save them during Non-secure <-> Secure world switches. This option must be enabled if the hardware has the registers or the values will be leaked during world switches.
To prevent leaks, this patch also disables pointer authentication in the Secure world if CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS is 0. Any attempt to use it will be trapped in EL3.
Change-Id: I27beba9907b9a86c6df1d0c5bf6180c972830855 Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
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| 6f03bc77 | 07-Jun-2018 |
Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com> |
SDEI: Ensure SDEI handler executes with CVE-2018-3639 mitigation enabled
When dynamic mitigation is used, the SDEI handler is required to execute with the mitigation enabled by default, regardless o
SDEI: Ensure SDEI handler executes with CVE-2018-3639 mitigation enabled
When dynamic mitigation is used, the SDEI handler is required to execute with the mitigation enabled by default, regardless of the mitigation state for lower ELs. This means that if the kernel or hypervisor explicitly disables the mitigation and then later when the event is dispatched, the dispatcher will remember the mitigation state for the lower ELs but force the mitigation to be on during the SDEI handler execution. When the SDEI handler returns, it will restore the mitigation state.
This behaviour is described in "Firmware interfaces for mitigating cache speculation vulnerabilities System Software on Arm Systems"[0].
[0] https://developer.arm.com/cache-speculation-vulnerability-firmware-specification
Change-Id: I8dd60b736be0aa9e832b0f92d67a401fdeb417f4 Signed-off-by: Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
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