| f7434fa1 | 12-Sep-2024 |
Dario Binacchi <dario.binacchi@amarulasolutions.com> |
fix(imx8m): ensure domain permissions for the console
The commit d76f012ea8fc0 ("refactor(imx8m): replace magic number with enum type") also hardcodes the domain permissions configuration for the UA
fix(imx8m): ensure domain permissions for the console
The commit d76f012ea8fc0 ("refactor(imx8m): replace magic number with enum type") also hardcodes the domain permissions configuration for the UARTs, causing a regression for any board using a boot console different from UART2. Indeed, previously, the RDC_PDAP_UARTn registers were set to the reset value (0xff), meaning all domains were enabled for read and write access.
This patch fixes this regression by ensuring that the console always has read/write access enabled for domain 0.
Tested on a i.MX8MN BSH SMM S2 PRO board.
Fixes: d76f012ea8fc0 ("refactor(imx8m): replace magic number with enum type") Change-Id: I2670bf485372f32ef45cebb72a7694a9a800f417 Signed-off-by: Dario Binacchi <dario.binacchi@amarulasolutions.com>
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| 11d32b33 | 18-Jan-2024 |
Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de> |
feat(imx8mm): optionally take params from BL2
Optionally take params from BL2 to offer more flexibility to BL2 on where and if a BL32 image is expected. This uses imx_bl31_params_parse() to check if
feat(imx8mm): optionally take params from BL2
Optionally take params from BL2 to offer more flexibility to BL2 on where and if a BL32 image is expected. This uses imx_bl31_params_parse() to check if arg0 can safely be accessed as a pointer and actually contains a bl_params_t structure. If not, the hardcoded parameter values are used as before.
Change-Id: I06b3012c67e43ea1e42946d863226bd93ccd4638 Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
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| 1156c763 | 04-Mar-2024 |
Stefan Kerkmann <s.kerkmann@pengutronix.de> |
feat(imx8mm): restrict peripheral access to secure world
This restricts and locks all security relevant peripherals to only be changeable by the secure world. Otherwise the normal world can simply c
feat(imx8mm): restrict peripheral access to secure world
This restricts and locks all security relevant peripherals to only be changeable by the secure world. Otherwise the normal world can simply change the access settings and defeat all security measures put in place.
Change-Id: I484a2c8164e58b68256d829470e00d5ec473e266 Signed-off-by: Stefan Kerkmann <s.kerkmann@pengutronix.de>
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| f4b11e59 | 04-Mar-2024 |
Stefan Kerkmann <s.kerkmann@pengutronix.de> |
feat(imx8mm): set and lock almost all peripherals as non-secure
This sets and locks all peripheral type-1 masters, except CAAM, access as non-secure, so that they can't access secure world resources
feat(imx8mm): set and lock almost all peripherals as non-secure
This sets and locks all peripheral type-1 masters, except CAAM, access as non-secure, so that they can't access secure world resources from the normal world.
The CAAM itself is TrustZone aware and handles memory access between the normal world and the secure world on its own. Pinning it as non-secure access results in bus aborts if the secure memory region is protected by the TZASC380.
Change-Id: Idba4d8a491ccce0491489c61e73545baab1889c4 Signed-off-by: Stefan Kerkmann <s.kerkmann@pengutronix.de>
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| 4827613c | 06-Sep-2023 |
Marco Felsch <m.felsch@pengutronix.de> |
fix(imx8m): map BL32 memory only if SPD_opteed or SPD_trusty is enabled
Always map the BL32 memory can interfere with the BL33 mapping if the BL33 is not aware of the mapping, e.g. different memory
fix(imx8m): map BL32 memory only if SPD_opteed or SPD_trusty is enabled
Always map the BL32 memory can interfere with the BL33 mapping if the BL33 is not aware of the mapping, e.g. different memory tagging secure/non-secure. Therefore map the memory only if BL32 (opteed, trusty) is enabled and BL33 is aware of this memory mapping.
Signed-off-by: Marco Felsch <m.felsch@pengutronix.de> Change-Id: I9c2bf78aa6e88c93e749a9248724186fee9df864
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