| /rk3399_ARM-atf/include/arch/aarch32/ |
| H A D | smccc_macros.S | 6bc243825f561e87ef7af7f51b218c6b0dab9b78 Wed Feb 26 18:37:05 UTC 2020 Madhukar Pappireddy <madhukar.pappireddy@arm.com> aarch32: stop speculative execution past exception returns
aarch32 CPUs speculatively execute instructions following a
ERET as if it was not a jump instruction. This could lead to
cache-based side channel vulnerabilities. The software fix is
to place barrier instructions following ERET.
The counterpart patch for aarch64 is merged:
https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a.git/commit/?id=f461fe346b728d0e88142fd7b8f2816415af18bc
Change-Id: I2aa3105bee0b92238f389830b3a3b8650f33af3d
Signed-off-by: Madhukar Pappireddy <madhukar.pappireddy@arm.com>
|
| H A D | asm_macros.S | 6bc243825f561e87ef7af7f51b218c6b0dab9b78 Wed Feb 26 18:37:05 UTC 2020 Madhukar Pappireddy <madhukar.pappireddy@arm.com> aarch32: stop speculative execution past exception returns
aarch32 CPUs speculatively execute instructions following a
ERET as if it was not a jump instruction. This could lead to
cache-based side channel vulnerabilities. The software fix is
to place barrier instructions following ERET.
The counterpart patch for aarch64 is merged:
https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a.git/commit/?id=f461fe346b728d0e88142fd7b8f2816415af18bc
Change-Id: I2aa3105bee0b92238f389830b3a3b8650f33af3d
Signed-off-by: Madhukar Pappireddy <madhukar.pappireddy@arm.com>
|
| /rk3399_ARM-atf/lib/cpus/aarch64/ |
| H A D | wa_cve_2017_5715_mmu.S | f461fe346b728d0e88142fd7b8f2816415af18bc Tue Jan 07 23:44:06 UTC 2020 Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com> Prevent speculative execution past ERET
Even though ERET always causes a jump to another address, aarch64 CPUs
speculatively execute following instructions as if the ERET
instruction was not a jump instruction.
The speculative execution does not cross privilege-levels (to the jump
target as one would expect), but it continues on the kernel privilege
level as if the ERET instruction did not change the control flow -
thus execution anything that is accidentally linked after the ERET
instruction. Later, the results of this speculative execution are
always architecturally discarded, however they can leak data using
microarchitectural side channels. This speculative execution is very
reliable (seems to be unconditional) and it manages to complete even
relatively performance-heavy operations (e.g. multiple dependent
fetches from uncached memory).
This was fixed in Linux, FreeBSD, OpenBSD and Optee OS:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/679db70801da9fda91d26caf13bf5b5ccc74e8e8
https://github.com/freebsd/freebsd/commit/29fb48ace4186a41c409fde52bcf4216e9e50b61
https://github.com/openbsd/src/commit/3a08873ece1cb28ace89fd65e8f3c1375cc98de2
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/commit/abfd092aa19f9c0251e3d5551e2d68a9ebcfec8a
It is demonstrated in a SafeSide example:
https://github.com/google/safeside/blob/master/demos/eret_hvc_smc_wrapper.cc
https://github.com/google/safeside/blob/master/kernel_modules/kmod_eret_hvc_smc/eret_hvc_smc_module.c
Signed-off-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
Change-Id: Iead39b0b9fb4b8d8b5609daaa8be81497ba63a0f
|
| H A D | cortex_a76.S | f461fe346b728d0e88142fd7b8f2816415af18bc Tue Jan 07 23:44:06 UTC 2020 Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com> Prevent speculative execution past ERET
Even though ERET always causes a jump to another address, aarch64 CPUs
speculatively execute following instructions as if the ERET
instruction was not a jump instruction.
The speculative execution does not cross privilege-levels (to the jump
target as one would expect), but it continues on the kernel privilege
level as if the ERET instruction did not change the control flow -
thus execution anything that is accidentally linked after the ERET
instruction. Later, the results of this speculative execution are
always architecturally discarded, however they can leak data using
microarchitectural side channels. This speculative execution is very
reliable (seems to be unconditional) and it manages to complete even
relatively performance-heavy operations (e.g. multiple dependent
fetches from uncached memory).
This was fixed in Linux, FreeBSD, OpenBSD and Optee OS:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/679db70801da9fda91d26caf13bf5b5ccc74e8e8
https://github.com/freebsd/freebsd/commit/29fb48ace4186a41c409fde52bcf4216e9e50b61
https://github.com/openbsd/src/commit/3a08873ece1cb28ace89fd65e8f3c1375cc98de2
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/commit/abfd092aa19f9c0251e3d5551e2d68a9ebcfec8a
It is demonstrated in a SafeSide example:
https://github.com/google/safeside/blob/master/demos/eret_hvc_smc_wrapper.cc
https://github.com/google/safeside/blob/master/kernel_modules/kmod_eret_hvc_smc/eret_hvc_smc_module.c
Signed-off-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
Change-Id: Iead39b0b9fb4b8d8b5609daaa8be81497ba63a0f
|
| H A D | neoverse_n1.S | f461fe346b728d0e88142fd7b8f2816415af18bc Tue Jan 07 23:44:06 UTC 2020 Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com> Prevent speculative execution past ERET
Even though ERET always causes a jump to another address, aarch64 CPUs
speculatively execute following instructions as if the ERET
instruction was not a jump instruction.
The speculative execution does not cross privilege-levels (to the jump
target as one would expect), but it continues on the kernel privilege
level as if the ERET instruction did not change the control flow -
thus execution anything that is accidentally linked after the ERET
instruction. Later, the results of this speculative execution are
always architecturally discarded, however they can leak data using
microarchitectural side channels. This speculative execution is very
reliable (seems to be unconditional) and it manages to complete even
relatively performance-heavy operations (e.g. multiple dependent
fetches from uncached memory).
This was fixed in Linux, FreeBSD, OpenBSD and Optee OS:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/679db70801da9fda91d26caf13bf5b5ccc74e8e8
https://github.com/freebsd/freebsd/commit/29fb48ace4186a41c409fde52bcf4216e9e50b61
https://github.com/openbsd/src/commit/3a08873ece1cb28ace89fd65e8f3c1375cc98de2
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/commit/abfd092aa19f9c0251e3d5551e2d68a9ebcfec8a
It is demonstrated in a SafeSide example:
https://github.com/google/safeside/blob/master/demos/eret_hvc_smc_wrapper.cc
https://github.com/google/safeside/blob/master/kernel_modules/kmod_eret_hvc_smc/eret_hvc_smc_module.c
Signed-off-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
Change-Id: Iead39b0b9fb4b8d8b5609daaa8be81497ba63a0f
|
| /rk3399_ARM-atf/bl1/aarch32/ |
| H A D | bl1_exceptions.S | 6bc243825f561e87ef7af7f51b218c6b0dab9b78 Wed Feb 26 18:37:05 UTC 2020 Madhukar Pappireddy <madhukar.pappireddy@arm.com> aarch32: stop speculative execution past exception returns
aarch32 CPUs speculatively execute instructions following a
ERET as if it was not a jump instruction. This could lead to
cache-based side channel vulnerabilities. The software fix is
to place barrier instructions following ERET.
The counterpart patch for aarch64 is merged:
https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a.git/commit/?id=f461fe346b728d0e88142fd7b8f2816415af18bc
Change-Id: I2aa3105bee0b92238f389830b3a3b8650f33af3d
Signed-off-by: Madhukar Pappireddy <madhukar.pappireddy@arm.com>
|
| /rk3399_ARM-atf/bl32/tsp/aarch64/ |
| H A D | tsp_exceptions.S | f461fe346b728d0e88142fd7b8f2816415af18bc Tue Jan 07 23:44:06 UTC 2020 Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com> Prevent speculative execution past ERET
Even though ERET always causes a jump to another address, aarch64 CPUs
speculatively execute following instructions as if the ERET
instruction was not a jump instruction.
The speculative execution does not cross privilege-levels (to the jump
target as one would expect), but it continues on the kernel privilege
level as if the ERET instruction did not change the control flow -
thus execution anything that is accidentally linked after the ERET
instruction. Later, the results of this speculative execution are
always architecturally discarded, however they can leak data using
microarchitectural side channels. This speculative execution is very
reliable (seems to be unconditional) and it manages to complete even
relatively performance-heavy operations (e.g. multiple dependent
fetches from uncached memory).
This was fixed in Linux, FreeBSD, OpenBSD and Optee OS:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/679db70801da9fda91d26caf13bf5b5ccc74e8e8
https://github.com/freebsd/freebsd/commit/29fb48ace4186a41c409fde52bcf4216e9e50b61
https://github.com/openbsd/src/commit/3a08873ece1cb28ace89fd65e8f3c1375cc98de2
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/commit/abfd092aa19f9c0251e3d5551e2d68a9ebcfec8a
It is demonstrated in a SafeSide example:
https://github.com/google/safeside/blob/master/demos/eret_hvc_smc_wrapper.cc
https://github.com/google/safeside/blob/master/kernel_modules/kmod_eret_hvc_smc/eret_hvc_smc_module.c
Signed-off-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
Change-Id: Iead39b0b9fb4b8d8b5609daaa8be81497ba63a0f
|
| /rk3399_ARM-atf/bl2/aarch32/ |
| H A D | bl2_el3_entrypoint.S | 6bc243825f561e87ef7af7f51b218c6b0dab9b78 Wed Feb 26 18:37:05 UTC 2020 Madhukar Pappireddy <madhukar.pappireddy@arm.com> aarch32: stop speculative execution past exception returns
aarch32 CPUs speculatively execute instructions following a
ERET as if it was not a jump instruction. This could lead to
cache-based side channel vulnerabilities. The software fix is
to place barrier instructions following ERET.
The counterpart patch for aarch64 is merged:
https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a.git/commit/?id=f461fe346b728d0e88142fd7b8f2816415af18bc
Change-Id: I2aa3105bee0b92238f389830b3a3b8650f33af3d
Signed-off-by: Madhukar Pappireddy <madhukar.pappireddy@arm.com>
|
| /rk3399_ARM-atf/bl2/aarch64/ |
| H A D | bl2_el3_entrypoint.S | f461fe346b728d0e88142fd7b8f2816415af18bc Tue Jan 07 23:44:06 UTC 2020 Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com> Prevent speculative execution past ERET
Even though ERET always causes a jump to another address, aarch64 CPUs
speculatively execute following instructions as if the ERET
instruction was not a jump instruction.
The speculative execution does not cross privilege-levels (to the jump
target as one would expect), but it continues on the kernel privilege
level as if the ERET instruction did not change the control flow -
thus execution anything that is accidentally linked after the ERET
instruction. Later, the results of this speculative execution are
always architecturally discarded, however they can leak data using
microarchitectural side channels. This speculative execution is very
reliable (seems to be unconditional) and it manages to complete even
relatively performance-heavy operations (e.g. multiple dependent
fetches from uncached memory).
This was fixed in Linux, FreeBSD, OpenBSD and Optee OS:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/679db70801da9fda91d26caf13bf5b5ccc74e8e8
https://github.com/freebsd/freebsd/commit/29fb48ace4186a41c409fde52bcf4216e9e50b61
https://github.com/openbsd/src/commit/3a08873ece1cb28ace89fd65e8f3c1375cc98de2
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/commit/abfd092aa19f9c0251e3d5551e2d68a9ebcfec8a
It is demonstrated in a SafeSide example:
https://github.com/google/safeside/blob/master/demos/eret_hvc_smc_wrapper.cc
https://github.com/google/safeside/blob/master/kernel_modules/kmod_eret_hvc_smc/eret_hvc_smc_module.c
Signed-off-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
Change-Id: Iead39b0b9fb4b8d8b5609daaa8be81497ba63a0f
|
| /rk3399_ARM-atf/include/arch/aarch64/ |
| H A D | asm_macros.S | f461fe346b728d0e88142fd7b8f2816415af18bc Tue Jan 07 23:44:06 UTC 2020 Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com> Prevent speculative execution past ERET
Even though ERET always causes a jump to another address, aarch64 CPUs
speculatively execute following instructions as if the ERET
instruction was not a jump instruction.
The speculative execution does not cross privilege-levels (to the jump
target as one would expect), but it continues on the kernel privilege
level as if the ERET instruction did not change the control flow -
thus execution anything that is accidentally linked after the ERET
instruction. Later, the results of this speculative execution are
always architecturally discarded, however they can leak data using
microarchitectural side channels. This speculative execution is very
reliable (seems to be unconditional) and it manages to complete even
relatively performance-heavy operations (e.g. multiple dependent
fetches from uncached memory).
This was fixed in Linux, FreeBSD, OpenBSD and Optee OS:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/679db70801da9fda91d26caf13bf5b5ccc74e8e8
https://github.com/freebsd/freebsd/commit/29fb48ace4186a41c409fde52bcf4216e9e50b61
https://github.com/openbsd/src/commit/3a08873ece1cb28ace89fd65e8f3c1375cc98de2
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/commit/abfd092aa19f9c0251e3d5551e2d68a9ebcfec8a
It is demonstrated in a SafeSide example:
https://github.com/google/safeside/blob/master/demos/eret_hvc_smc_wrapper.cc
https://github.com/google/safeside/blob/master/kernel_modules/kmod_eret_hvc_smc/eret_hvc_smc_module.c
Signed-off-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
Change-Id: Iead39b0b9fb4b8d8b5609daaa8be81497ba63a0f
|
| /rk3399_ARM-atf/bl1/aarch64/ |
| H A D | bl1_exceptions.S | f461fe346b728d0e88142fd7b8f2816415af18bc Tue Jan 07 23:44:06 UTC 2020 Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com> Prevent speculative execution past ERET
Even though ERET always causes a jump to another address, aarch64 CPUs
speculatively execute following instructions as if the ERET
instruction was not a jump instruction.
The speculative execution does not cross privilege-levels (to the jump
target as one would expect), but it continues on the kernel privilege
level as if the ERET instruction did not change the control flow -
thus execution anything that is accidentally linked after the ERET
instruction. Later, the results of this speculative execution are
always architecturally discarded, however they can leak data using
microarchitectural side channels. This speculative execution is very
reliable (seems to be unconditional) and it manages to complete even
relatively performance-heavy operations (e.g. multiple dependent
fetches from uncached memory).
This was fixed in Linux, FreeBSD, OpenBSD and Optee OS:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/679db70801da9fda91d26caf13bf5b5ccc74e8e8
https://github.com/freebsd/freebsd/commit/29fb48ace4186a41c409fde52bcf4216e9e50b61
https://github.com/openbsd/src/commit/3a08873ece1cb28ace89fd65e8f3c1375cc98de2
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/commit/abfd092aa19f9c0251e3d5551e2d68a9ebcfec8a
It is demonstrated in a SafeSide example:
https://github.com/google/safeside/blob/master/demos/eret_hvc_smc_wrapper.cc
https://github.com/google/safeside/blob/master/kernel_modules/kmod_eret_hvc_smc/eret_hvc_smc_module.c
Signed-off-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
Change-Id: Iead39b0b9fb4b8d8b5609daaa8be81497ba63a0f
|
| /rk3399_ARM-atf/bl31/aarch64/ |
| H A D | runtime_exceptions.S | f461fe346b728d0e88142fd7b8f2816415af18bc Tue Jan 07 23:44:06 UTC 2020 Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com> Prevent speculative execution past ERET
Even though ERET always causes a jump to another address, aarch64 CPUs
speculatively execute following instructions as if the ERET
instruction was not a jump instruction.
The speculative execution does not cross privilege-levels (to the jump
target as one would expect), but it continues on the kernel privilege
level as if the ERET instruction did not change the control flow -
thus execution anything that is accidentally linked after the ERET
instruction. Later, the results of this speculative execution are
always architecturally discarded, however they can leak data using
microarchitectural side channels. This speculative execution is very
reliable (seems to be unconditional) and it manages to complete even
relatively performance-heavy operations (e.g. multiple dependent
fetches from uncached memory).
This was fixed in Linux, FreeBSD, OpenBSD and Optee OS:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/679db70801da9fda91d26caf13bf5b5ccc74e8e8
https://github.com/freebsd/freebsd/commit/29fb48ace4186a41c409fde52bcf4216e9e50b61
https://github.com/openbsd/src/commit/3a08873ece1cb28ace89fd65e8f3c1375cc98de2
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/commit/abfd092aa19f9c0251e3d5551e2d68a9ebcfec8a
It is demonstrated in a SafeSide example:
https://github.com/google/safeside/blob/master/demos/eret_hvc_smc_wrapper.cc
https://github.com/google/safeside/blob/master/kernel_modules/kmod_eret_hvc_smc/eret_hvc_smc_module.c
Signed-off-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
Change-Id: Iead39b0b9fb4b8d8b5609daaa8be81497ba63a0f
|
| /rk3399_ARM-atf/lib/el3_runtime/aarch64/ |
| H A D | context.S | f461fe346b728d0e88142fd7b8f2816415af18bc Tue Jan 07 23:44:06 UTC 2020 Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com> Prevent speculative execution past ERET
Even though ERET always causes a jump to another address, aarch64 CPUs
speculatively execute following instructions as if the ERET
instruction was not a jump instruction.
The speculative execution does not cross privilege-levels (to the jump
target as one would expect), but it continues on the kernel privilege
level as if the ERET instruction did not change the control flow -
thus execution anything that is accidentally linked after the ERET
instruction. Later, the results of this speculative execution are
always architecturally discarded, however they can leak data using
microarchitectural side channels. This speculative execution is very
reliable (seems to be unconditional) and it manages to complete even
relatively performance-heavy operations (e.g. multiple dependent
fetches from uncached memory).
This was fixed in Linux, FreeBSD, OpenBSD and Optee OS:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/679db70801da9fda91d26caf13bf5b5ccc74e8e8
https://github.com/freebsd/freebsd/commit/29fb48ace4186a41c409fde52bcf4216e9e50b61
https://github.com/openbsd/src/commit/3a08873ece1cb28ace89fd65e8f3c1375cc98de2
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/commit/abfd092aa19f9c0251e3d5551e2d68a9ebcfec8a
It is demonstrated in a SafeSide example:
https://github.com/google/safeside/blob/master/demos/eret_hvc_smc_wrapper.cc
https://github.com/google/safeside/blob/master/kernel_modules/kmod_eret_hvc_smc/eret_hvc_smc_module.c
Signed-off-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
Change-Id: Iead39b0b9fb4b8d8b5609daaa8be81497ba63a0f
|