| 14d68630 | 08-Mar-2024 |
Thomas Bourgoin <thomas.bourgoin@foss.st.com> |
drivers: crypto: stm32_cryp: add delay when resetting CRYP peripheral.
Add 2 us of delay between reset assert and reset deassert to ensure the peripheral is properly reset.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bo
drivers: crypto: stm32_cryp: add delay when resetting CRYP peripheral.
Add 2 us of delay between reset assert and reset deassert to ensure the peripheral is properly reset.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bourgoin <thomas.bourgoin@foss.st.com> Reviewed-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@foss.st.com>
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| 1d8b1184 | 23-Feb-2024 |
Thomas Bourgoin <thomas.bourgoin@foss.st.com> |
drivers: crypto: stm32_cryp: remove reset binding requirements
Remove panic during probe when "resets" property is not found because it's optional in most cases.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bourgoin <tho
drivers: crypto: stm32_cryp: remove reset binding requirements
Remove panic during probe when "resets" property is not found because it's optional in most cases.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bourgoin <thomas.bourgoin@foss.st.com> Acked-by: Jerome Forissier <jerome.forissier@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@foss.st.com>
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| 9e255282 | 24-Mar-2024 |
loubaihui <loubaihui1@huawei.com> |
drivers: crypto: hisilicon: init HPRE hardware block
The HiSilicon HPRE is a High Performance RSA Engine. This module implement the hardware initialization of the HPRE.
Signed-off-by: loubaihui <lo
drivers: crypto: hisilicon: init HPRE hardware block
The HiSilicon HPRE is a High Performance RSA Engine. This module implement the hardware initialization of the HPRE.
Signed-off-by: loubaihui <loubaihui1@huawei.com> Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@foss.st.com> Acked-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
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| 344ef8a4 | 21-Mar-2024 |
Alvin Chang <alvinga@andestech.com> |
core: kernel: Fix typo in __do_panic()
Must be "preemption" instead of "prehemption".
Signed-off-by: Alvin Chang <alvinga@andestech.com> Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org> |
| c80790fe | 12-Mar-2024 |
Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@foss.st.com> |
drivers: regulator: use mutex_pm_aware
Use newly introduced struct mutex_pm_aware semaphore to protect regulator accesses.
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Eti
drivers: regulator: use mutex_pm_aware
Use newly introduced struct mutex_pm_aware semaphore to protect regulator accesses.
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@foss.st.com>
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| 9a3248fc | 29-Feb-2024 |
Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@foss.st.com> |
drivers: clk: replace clock main spinlock with a mutex
Change clock framework lock from an interrupts masked spinning lock to a mutex. This allows the clock framework to better handle slow stabilizi
drivers: clk: replace clock main spinlock with a mutex
Change clock framework lock from an interrupts masked spinning lock to a mutex. This allows the clock framework to better handle slow stabilizing clocks as PLLs without masking the system interrupt which can have side effects on the REE or even the TEE.
To support clock accesses during low power state transition sequences while non-secure world is no operating, the lock is not taken when the execution is not in the scope of a TEE thread.
This change is not expected to impact supported platforms that currently only access clock operation from thread contexts or atomic PM sequences.
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@foss.st.com>
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| 3a20c661 | 12-Mar-2024 |
Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@foss.st.com> |
core: kernel: mutex compliant with PM sequences
Add mutex_pm_aware_*() functions for mutex used on resources accessed at runtime using a conventional mutex and also during low power sequences that e
core: kernel: mutex compliant with PM sequences
Add mutex_pm_aware_*() functions for mutex used on resources accessed at runtime using a conventional mutex and also during low power sequences that execute in a non-thread context.
This change defines MUTEX_PM_AWARE_INITIALIZER macro from a new header file (mutex_pm_aware.h) instead of existing mutex.h to prevent a circular dependency between spinlock.h (requires thread.h), thread.h (indirectly includes mutex.h) and mutex.h (that would depend on spinlock.h for definition of the SPINLOCK_UNLOCK macro ).
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@foss.st.com>
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| f6412fbd | 12-Mar-2024 |
Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@foss.st.com> |
core: kernel: thread spin locking
Add thread_spin_lock() and thread_spin_unlock() for active spinning locks in situation where we need an exclusive lock in a thread and interruptible context even at
core: kernel: thread spin locking
Add thread_spin_lock() and thread_spin_unlock() for active spinning locks in situation where we need an exclusive lock in a thread and interruptible context even at the cost of a high CPU usage.
These function are intended to be used in thread context hence they assert being executed in such a context. This is to prevent on mistakenly spin in an atomic context which potentially leads to a deadlock situation.
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@foss.st.com>
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| 19ad526c | 13-Mar-2024 |
Balint Dobszay <balint.dobszay@arm.com> |
core: spmc, sp: cleanup FF-A ID handling
When OP-TEE implements the S-EL1 SPMC, from an FF-A point-of-view the core OP-TEE functionality is running in a logical SP that resides at the same exception
core: spmc, sp: cleanup FF-A ID handling
When OP-TEE implements the S-EL1 SPMC, from an FF-A point-of-view the core OP-TEE functionality is running in a logical SP that resides at the same exception level as the SPMC. This means that the SPMC and the SP should have separate FF-A IDs, i.e. the SPMC ID and a normal endpoint ID for the SP. The SPMC ID is described in the SPMC manifest which gets parsed by the SPMD, so this ID should be queried from the SPMD. OP-TEE's endpoint ID is assigned by the SPMC.
Currently OP-TEE's FF-A endpoint ID and the SPMC ID are mixed together and hardcoded, this patch implements the correct ID handling mechanism as described above.
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@foss.st.com> Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Balint Dobszay <balint.dobszay@arm.com>
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| 4c4387dc | 26-Feb-2024 |
Alvin Chang <alvinga@andestech.com> |
core: riscv: Prepare SATP for each hart
To support multiple harts environment, we have allocated root page table for each hart. Further more, we need to prepare value of CSR SATP, which holds the ph
core: riscv: Prepare SATP for each hart
To support multiple harts environment, we have allocated root page table for each hart. Further more, we need to prepare value of CSR SATP, which holds the physical page number (PPN) of the root page table, for each hart.
This commit enlarges the "struct core_mmu_config" for RISC-V architecture to hold the value of CSR SATP for all the harts. In early boot stage, each hart should initialize its CSR SATP from "struct core_mmu_config".
Signed-off-by: Alvin Chang <alvinga@andestech.com> Reviewed-by: Yu Chien Peter Lin <peterlin@andestech.com> Reviewed-by: Marouene Boubakri <marouene.boubakri@nxp.com> Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@foss.st.com>
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| fe9a2682 | 26-Feb-2024 |
Alvin Chang <alvinga@andestech.com> |
core: riscv: Allocate root page table for each hart
To support multiple hart environment, each hart must have its dedicated root page table. This commit enlarges the root page table. Also, when the
core: riscv: Allocate root page table for each hart
To support multiple hart environment, each hart must have its dedicated root page table. This commit enlarges the root page table. Also, when the primary hart initializes the page table, we also copy the contents of its root page table to the secondary harts' root page tables. Therefore, all the harts have initial page tables at the boot time.
Signed-off-by: Alvin Chang <alvinga@andestech.com> Reviewed-by: Yu Chien Peter Lin <peterlin@andestech.com> Reviewed-by: Marouene Boubakri <marouene.boubakri@nxp.com> Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@foss.st.com>
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| 23f867d3 | 19-Mar-2024 |
Jerome Forissier <jerome.forissier@linaro.org> |
core: arm64: increase STACK_ABT_SIZE from 1024 to 3072 when log level is 0
When adding "make check CFG_WITH_PAGER=y CFG_TEE_CORE_LOG_LEVEL=0" to the QEMUv8 CI job, I noticed that OP-TEE fails to boo
core: arm64: increase STACK_ABT_SIZE from 1024 to 3072 when log level is 0
When adding "make check CFG_WITH_PAGER=y CFG_TEE_CORE_LOG_LEVEL=0" to the QEMUv8 CI job, I noticed that OP-TEE fails to boot and hangs with no message printed on the console. The root cause is memory corruption of the translation tables triggered by a stack overflow. Indeed, the pager uses the abort stack to handle unmapped pages, and therefore it requires quite a bit of stack space. The log level is not very relevant. Therefore, fix the issue by removing the particular case for log level 0.
More debugging info:
build$ make -j$(nproc) CFG_WITH_PAGER=y CFG_TEE_CORE_LOG_LEVEL=0 \ CFG_CORE_ASLR=n build$ aarch64-linux-gnu-nm -n ../optee_os/out/arm/core/tee.elf ... 000000000e115000 B __nozi_start 000000000e115000 b thread_user_kdata_page 000000000e116000 b xlat_tables_ul1 000000000e118000 b xlat_tables 000000000e11d000 b base_xlation_table 000000000e11d100 B __nozi_end 000000000e11d100 B __nozi_stack_start 000000000e11d100 b stack_abt 000000000e11e200 B stack_tmp ... build$ make run-only optee_qemuv8$ gdb-multiarch (gdb) symbol-file optee_os/out/arm/core/tee.elf (gdb) target remote localhost:1234 (gdb) p sizeof(base_xlation_table) $1 = 256 (gdb) watch *(char [256]*)base_xlation_table (gdb) c # 5 times Thread 1 hit Hardware watchpoint 1: *(char [256]*)base_xlation_table (gdb) bt
At this point the call stack is:
hash_sha256_check() fobj_load_page() pager_deploy_page() pager_get_page() tee_pager_handle_fault() abort_handler() el1_sync_abort()
This code is indeed not supposed to touch base_xlation_table, it does so due to the overflow of stack_abt.
Suggested-by: Jens Wikander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Jerome Forissier <jerome.forissier@linaro.org> Acked-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
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| 1cf7e98d | 14-Mar-2024 |
Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org> |
core: replace REGISTER_TIME_SOURCE()
Remove REGISTER_TIME_SOURCE() and implement tee_time_get_sys_time() and tee_time_get_sys_time_protection_level() directly in the file where REGISTER_TIME_SOURCE(
core: replace REGISTER_TIME_SOURCE()
Remove REGISTER_TIME_SOURCE() and implement tee_time_get_sys_time() and tee_time_get_sys_time_protection_level() directly in the file where REGISTER_TIME_SOURCE() was used previously.
By avoiding indirect calls the linker can optimize the dependency tree properly and we can remove the DECLARE_KEEP_PAGER() directive needed for arm_cntpct_time_source.
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@foss.st.com> Reviewed-by: Jerome Forissier <jerome.forissier@linaro.org>
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| 63bfec5e | 02-Mar-2024 |
Alvin Chang <alvinga@andestech.com> |
core: riscv: Apply SM-based boot flow for secondary harts
When the system adopts M-mode secure monitor based solution, the secondary harts need to hand over the control back to the secure monitor af
core: riscv: Apply SM-based boot flow for secondary harts
When the system adopts M-mode secure monitor based solution, the secondary harts need to hand over the control back to the secure monitor after the initial boot sequence. Add related code for this purpose.
Signed-off-by: Alvin Chang <alvinga@andestech.com> Reviewed-by: Marouene Boubakri <marouene.boubakri@nxp.com>
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| 058cf712 | 10-Nov-2023 |
Alvin Chang <alvinga@andestech.com> |
core: riscv: Do not restrict primary hart to hart ID 0 only
The ID of primary hart should not be restricted to zero. Thus, determining primary hart and secondart harts by zero hart ID is not feasibl
core: riscv: Do not restrict primary hart to hart ID 0 only
The ID of primary hart should not be restricted to zero. Thus, determining primary hart and secondart harts by zero hart ID is not feasible.
We refer to RISC-V linux kernel [1] to fix this issue, by adding a "hart_lottery" variable. The first hart who enters OP-TEE will win the lottery, atomically increment this variable, and be the primary hart. Other harts enter OP-TEE later won't win the lottery, so they execute the secondary boot sequence.
[1]: https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/v6.7/arch/riscv/kernel/head.S#L244
Signed-off-by: Alvin Chang <alvinga@andestech.com> Reviewed-by: Marouene Boubakri <marouene.boubakri@nxp.com>
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| 1706a284 | 23-Jan-2024 |
Alvin Chang <alvinga@andestech.com> |
core: riscv: Change the condition of communication with untrusted domain
Use CFG_RISCV_WITH_M_MODE_SM to determine if OP-TEE uses M-mode secure monitor based solution to communicate with the untruse
core: riscv: Change the condition of communication with untrusted domain
Use CFG_RISCV_WITH_M_MODE_SM to determine if OP-TEE uses M-mode secure monitor based solution to communicate with the untrusetd domain.
Signed-off-by: Alvin Chang <alvinga@andestech.com> Reviewed-by: Marouene Boubakri <marouene.boubakri@nxp.com>
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| 83abc784 | 23-Jan-2024 |
Alvin Chang <alvinga@andestech.com> |
riscv: plat-virt: Set CFG_RISCV_WITH_M_MODE_SM as 'y'
In RISC-V QEMU virtual platform, OP-TEE OS uses M-mode secure monitor based solution to communicate with the untrusted domain. Therefore, set CF
riscv: plat-virt: Set CFG_RISCV_WITH_M_MODE_SM as 'y'
In RISC-V QEMU virtual platform, OP-TEE OS uses M-mode secure monitor based solution to communicate with the untrusted domain. Therefore, set CFG_RISCV_WITH_M_MODE_SM to 'y' in its configuration file.
Signed-off-by: Alvin Chang <alvinga@andestech.com> Reviewed-by: Marouene Boubakri <marouene.boubakri@nxp.com>
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| a30b4486 | 23-Jan-2024 |
Alvin Chang <alvinga@andestech.com> |
core: riscv: Add CFG_RISCV_WITH_M_MODE_SM and dependency checking
OP-TEE may communicate with the untrusted domain by different solutions, such as M-mode secure monitor based solution, or direct mes
core: riscv: Add CFG_RISCV_WITH_M_MODE_SM and dependency checking
OP-TEE may communicate with the untrusted domain by different solutions, such as M-mode secure monitor based solution, or direct messaging based solution. This commit adds CFG_RISCV_WITH_M_MODE_SM to indicate that OP-TEE uses M-mode secure monitor based solution for the communication.
The CFG_RISCV_WITH_M_MODE_SM should depend on CFG_RISCV_S_MODE and CFG_RISCV_SBI, since we are using "ecall" to trap into M-mode secure monitor.
Signed-off-by: Alvin Chang <alvinga@andestech.com> Reviewed-by: Marouene Boubakri <marouene.boubakri@nxp.com>
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| ea11f512 | 23-Oct-2023 |
Alvin Chang <alvinga@andestech.com> |
core: riscv: Apply mask/unmask exceptions when operating page table
Add missing thread_{mask/unmask}_exceptions() when we operate the page table. This is referenced from ARM architecture.
Signed-of
core: riscv: Apply mask/unmask exceptions when operating page table
Add missing thread_{mask/unmask}_exceptions() when we operate the page table. This is referenced from ARM architecture.
Signed-off-by: Alvin Chang <alvinga@andestech.com> Tested-by: Marouene Boubakri <marouene.boubakri@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Marouene Boubakri <marouene.boubakri@nxp.com>
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| d1d1ca23 | 23-Oct-2023 |
Alvin Chang <alvinga@andestech.com> |
core: riscv: Apply STATUS helper for RPC resume
Since RPC resume is a kind of exception return, we invoke xstatus_for_xret() to prepare the CSR STATUS for exception return. But the actual value of S
core: riscv: Apply STATUS helper for RPC resume
Since RPC resume is a kind of exception return, we invoke xstatus_for_xret() to prepare the CSR STATUS for exception return. But the actual value of STATUS when calling thread_rpc() is still saved in stack. This is to unify the behavior between RPC suspend and resume.
Signed-off-by: Alvin Chang <alvinga@andestech.com> Tested-by: Marouene Boubakri <marouene.boubakri@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Marouene Boubakri <marouene.boubakri@nxp.com>
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| de45f2fb | 23-Oct-2023 |
Alvin Chang <alvinga@andestech.com> |
core: riscv: Apply exception return to handle_user_mode_panic()
Now thread_exit_user_mode() executes exception return to kernel mode. Invoke xstatus_for_xret() helper function to prepare CSR STATUS
core: riscv: Apply exception return to handle_user_mode_panic()
Now thread_exit_user_mode() executes exception return to kernel mode. Invoke xstatus_for_xret() helper function to prepare CSR STATUS for exception return.
Signed-off-by: Alvin Chang <alvinga@andestech.com> Tested-by: Marouene Boubakri <marouene.boubakri@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Marouene Boubakri <marouene.boubakri@nxp.com>
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| 4fe3a3f7 | 23-Oct-2023 |
Alvin Chang <alvinga@andestech.com> |
core: riscv: Refine thread trap handler
In order to support SMP, we made change on CSR SCRATCH from kernel stack pointer to be kernel TP(thread_core_local). So that we can get TP from SCRATCH easily
core: riscv: Refine thread trap handler
In order to support SMP, we made change on CSR SCRATCH from kernel stack pointer to be kernel TP(thread_core_local). So that we can get TP from SCRATCH easily in trap handler when the thread is in user mode. We also save/restore CSR IE, kernel GP and SP so that we can handle task migration to another hart.
Signed-off-by: Alvin Chang <alvinga@andestech.com> Tested-by: Marouene Boubakri <marouene.boubakri@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Marouene Boubakri <marouene.boubakri@nxp.com>
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| b5bb30b3 | 23-Oct-2023 |
Alvin Chang <alvinga@andestech.com> |
core: riscv: Refine thread enter/exit user mode
Now when thread is in user mode, the kernel TP is saved into CSR SCRATCH instead of into kernel stack. The IE is also considered since it contains mas
core: riscv: Refine thread enter/exit user mode
Now when thread is in user mode, the kernel TP is saved into CSR SCRATCH instead of into kernel stack. The IE is also considered since it contains masks of different exceptions.
Apply exception return to thread_exit_user_mode() to let hart correctly back to kernel mode from exception.
Signed-off-by: Alvin Chang <alvinga@andestech.com> Tested-by: Marouene Boubakri <marouene.boubakri@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Marouene Boubakri <marouene.boubakri@nxp.com>
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| 09653bca | 23-Oct-2023 |
Alvin Chang <alvinga@andestech.com> |
core: riscv: Apply exception return to resume thread
In current implementation, the thread is resumed by function return. It is not suitable for all scenarios, especially when the thread should be r
core: riscv: Apply exception return to resume thread
In current implementation, the thread is resumed by function return. It is not suitable for all scenarios, especially when the thread should be resumed to user mode. The kernel mode can not return to user mode by pure function return.
This commit applies exception return to resume the thread. The EPC and IE are added into thread context. The xstatus_for_xret() helper function is added to prepare the value of CSR STATUS for exception return. Currently we only consider PIE(previous interrupt-enable) and PP(previous privilege mode) for exception return.
We clear thread context when the context is reinitialized, enable native interrupt, and setup kernel GP/TP. The thread_resume() now takes care of restoring CSR EPC, STATUS, IE, SCRATCH and all general-purpose registers. Finally it executes exception return to target privilege mode encoded in CSR STATUS. The registers GP and TP are also restored since user mode may use them.
This commit also modify the usage of CSR SCRATCH. In current implementation the SCRATCH is used to save kernel stack pointer when the thread is in user mode. The value of TP, which stores thread_core_local structure, is saved into kernel stack before entering user mode. The trap handler can then get TP(thread_core_local) from kernel stack. This is not suitable for SMP system, since the thread might be resumed to another core, and that core gets wrong TP from kernel stack. Fix it by directly storing TP into CSR SCRATCH.
Signed-off-by: Alvin Chang <alvinga@andestech.com> Reviewed-by: Marouene Boubakri <marouene.boubakri@nxp.com> Tested-by: Marouene Boubakri <marouene.boubakri@nxp.com>
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| b2f99d20 | 01-Feb-2024 |
Olivier Deprez <olivier.deprez@arm.com> |
core: boot: fix memtag init sequence
Based on following observations on FVP: With boot_init_memtag called before MMU enable, DC GZA hits an alignment fault. This is because all accesses are of devic
core: boot: fix memtag init sequence
Based on following observations on FVP: With boot_init_memtag called before MMU enable, DC GZA hits an alignment fault. This is because all accesses are of device type when MMU is off. Arm ARM states for DC GZA: "If the memory region being modified is any type of Device memory, this instruction can give an alignment fault." Moving boot_init_memtag after MMU enable, DC GZA hits a permission fault, this is because the range returned by core_mmu_get_secure_memory consists of pages mapped RO (text sections) and then RW (data sections) consecutively. DC GZA is a write instruction executed towards an RO page leading to a fault.
To fix this, split boot_init_memtag into two halves: - Setup memtag operations before MMU is enabled such that MAIR_EL1 is properly configured for normal tagged memory. - Clear core TEE RW sections after MMU is enabled.
Closes: https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/issues/6649 Signed-off-by: Olivier Deprez <olivier.deprez@arm.com> [jw rewrote boot_clear_memtag()] Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org> Acked-by: Jerome Forissier <jerome.forissier@linaro.org> Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@foss.st.com>
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