| /rk3399_ARM-atf/docs/design/ |
| H A D | interrupt-framework-design.rst | 11 the interrupt to either software in EL3 or Secure-EL1 depending upon the 21 knowledge of software executing in Secure-EL1/Secure-EL0. The choice of 35 #. Secure EL1 interrupt. This type of interrupt can be routed to EL3 or 36 Secure-EL1 depending upon the security state of the current execution 37 context. It is always handled in Secure-EL1. 40 Secure-EL1, Non-secure EL1 or EL2 depending upon the security state of the 41 current execution context. It is always handled in either Non-secure EL1 44 #. EL3 interrupt. This type of interrupt can be routed to EL3 or Secure-EL1 85 for GIC version 3.0 (Arm GICv3) and only the Secure-EL1 and Non-secure interrupt 95 Secure-EL1 interrupts [all …]
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| H A D | firmware-design.rst | 55 - Boot Loader stage 3-2 (BL32) *Secure-EL1 Payload* (optional) 227 SYS_LED[2:1] - Exception Level (EL3=0x3, EL2=0x2, EL1=0x1, EL0=0x0) 314 #. BL1 passes control to the BL2 image at Secure EL1 (for AArch64) or at 320 BL1 loads and passes control to BL2 at Secure-EL1 (for AArch64) or at Secure 329 for subsequent stages of TF-A and normal world software. EL1 and EL0 are given 386 AArch64 BL32 (Secure-EL1 Payload) image load 395 Secure-EL1 Payload Dispatcher (see later) within BL31, which is responsible for 431 as its only purpose is to ensure TF-A BL2 is entered at S-EL1. To avoid 550 AArch64 BL32 (Secure-EL1 Payload) image initialization 553 If a BL32 image is present then there must be a matching Secure-EL1 Payload [all …]
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| /rk3399_ARM-atf/docs/components/ |
| H A D | secure-partition-manager.rst | 39 the secure world, managing multiple S-EL1 or S-EL0 partitions `[5]`_. 40 #. EL3 SPMC based on the FF-A specification, managing a single S-EL1 partition 54 S-EL1 or S-EL2: 58 - The same SPMD component is used for both S-EL1 and S-EL2 SPMC configurations. 63 - S-EL1 SPMC for platforms not supporting the FEAT_SEL2 architecture 64 extension. The SPMD relays the FF-A protocol from EL3 to S-EL1. 73 SPMC located at S-EL1, S-EL2 or EL3: 83 SPMC exception level is set to S-EL1. 97 | SPMC at S-EL1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 123 Sample TF-A build command line when the SPMC is located at S-EL1 [all …]
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| H A D | secure-partition-manager-mm.rst | 36 privileged Exception Level (i.e. EL3 or S-EL1) makes security auditing of 120 Payload image executing at S-EL1 (e.g. a Trusted OS). Both are referred to as 258 A SVC causes an exception to be taken to S-EL1. TF-A assumes ownership of S-EL1 259 and installs a simple exception vector table in S-EL1 that relays a SVC request 294 the Secure EL1&0 translation regime). 403 description and initialises the Secure EL1&0 translation regime as follows. 422 S-EL0 or S-EL1. 484 buffer will be mapped in the Secure EL1&0 translation regime with read-only 556 The buffer is mapped in the Secure EL1&0 translation regime with read-only 602 the Secure EL1&0 Translation regime with appropriate memory attributes. [all …]
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| H A D | el3-spmc.rst | 14 - Manages a single S-EL1 Secure Partition 16 - Provides support for EL3 Logical Partitions to support easy migration from EL3 to S-EL1. 23 and SPMC at EL3, one S-EL1 secure partition, with an optional 46 - BL32 option is re-purposed to specify the S-EL1 TEE or SP image. 159 exception-level = <0x2>; /* S-EL1 */ 456 SPMC only supports a single Pinned MP S-EL1 SP. The *execution-ctx-count* 465 - SPMC is capable of forwarding Secure interrupt to S-EL1 SP 468 - Interrupt Number is not passed, S-EL1 SP can access the GIC registers directly.
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| H A D | context-management-library.rst | 39 (EL2/EL1, vector, general-purpose registers), will be overwritten, as the software 80 EL3 should initialise and monitor S-EL2 registers only. S-EL1 registers should 82 absent, S-EL1 registers should be initialised from EL3. 426 EL1 Registers 433 at EL3 to facilitate the saving and restoration of the EL1 system registers 490 in any EL2 registers that are necessary for execution in EL1 with no EL2 present. 542 EL3 from NS world, the EL1 and EL2 system registers which might be modified in 543 lower exception levels NS(EL2/EL1) will carry forward those values to EL3. 545 world, written during the previous ERET from EL3 to NS(EL2/EL1).
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| H A D | platform-interrupt-controller-API.rst | 153 Secure EL1 interrupts. 156 for Secure EL1 interrupts. 173 - ``INTR_TYPE_S_EL1``: interrupt is meant to be consumed by Secure EL1.
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| H A D | exception-handling.rst | 147 - On GICv3 systems, when executing in S-EL1, pending Non-secure interrupts of 149 EL3. As a result, S-EL1 software cannot expect to handle Non-secure 150 interrupts at S-EL1. Essentially, this deprecates the routing mode described 153 In order for S-EL1 software to handle Non-secure interrupts while having 156 handled over to S-EL1. 489 to be taken to S-EL1 [#irq]_, so would get a chance to populate the designated 500 .. [#irq] In case of GICv2, Non-secure interrupts while in S-EL1 were signalled
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| H A D | xlat-tables-lib-v2-design.rst | 74 the EL1&0 translation regime, the attributes also specify whether the region is 75 a User region (EL0) or Privileged region (EL1). See the ``MT_xxx`` definitions 76 in ``xlat_tables_v2.h``. Note that for the EL1&0 translation regime the Execute 77 Never attribute is set simultaneously for both EL1 and EL0. 111 create translation tables pertaining to the S-EL1&0 translation regime.
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| H A D | arm-sip-service.rst | 37 Exception Level (either EL2, or NS EL1 if EL2 isn't implemented) to request to
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| /rk3399_ARM-atf/docs/security_advisories/ |
| H A D | security-advisory-tfv-3.rst | 5 | Title | RO memory is always executable at AArch64 Secure EL1 | 15 | Affected | executing at AArch64 Secure EL1 | 34 This feature does not work correctly for AArch64 images executing at Secure EL1. 58 determine whether a region is executable. The Secure EL1&0 translation regime 61 in the Secure EL1&0 regime. As a result, this programs the Secure EL0 execution 62 permissions but always leaves the memory as executable at Secure EL1.
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| H A D | security-advisory-tfv-2.rst | 43 meaning that debug exceptions from Secure EL1 are enabled by the authentication 44 interface. Therefore this issue only exists for AArch32 Secure EL1 code when 50 from AArch32 Secure EL1.
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| H A D | security-advisory-tfv-6.rst | 54 Secure-EL1 and executing the ``BPIALL`` instruction. This workaround is 76 disable/enable" and "BPIALL at AArch32 Secure-EL1" workarounds described above. 81 at invalidating the branch predictor on Cortex-A57, the drop into Secure-EL1 98 | ``PSCI_VERSION`` with "BPIALL at AArch32 Secure-EL1" | 1276 | 100 | ``SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1`` with "BPIALL at AArch32 Secure-EL1" | 770 | 131 translation regime, for example between EL0 and EL1, therefore this variant
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| H A D | security-advisory-tfv-5.rst | 39 transitioning to S-EL1. 50 NOTE: The original pull request referenced above only fixed the issue for S-EL1
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| /rk3399_ARM-atf/plat/arm/board/fvp/fdts/ |
| H A D | fvp_cactus_sp_manifest.dts | 23 exception-level = <2>; /* S-EL1 */
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| H A D | optee_sp_manifest.dts | 22 exception-level = <2>; /* S-EL1 */
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| /rk3399_ARM-atf/services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/ |
| H A D | spmc.h | 83 EL1 = 0, enumerator
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| /rk3399_ARM-atf/docs/perf/ |
| H A D | performance-monitoring-unit.rst | 79 - If set to ``0``, will increment the associated ``PMEVCNTR<n>`` at EL1. 85 Non-secure EL1.
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| /rk3399_ARM-atf/docs/getting_started/ |
| H A D | rt-svc-writers-guide.rst | 285 The PSCI and Test Secure-EL1 Payload Dispatcher services do not follow 305 Secure-EL1 Payload Dispatcher service (SPD) 309 or other Secure-EL1 Payload are special. These services need to manage the 310 Secure-EL1 context, provide the *Secure Monitor* functionality of switching 311 between the normal and secure worlds, deliver SMC Calls through to Secure-EL1 312 and generally manage the Secure-EL1 Payload through CPU power-state transitions.
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| H A D | image-terminology.rst | 74 Secure-EL1 Payload (SP): ``AP_BL32`` 78 normal world. However, it may refer to a more abstract Secure-EL1 Payload (SP). 80 single or primary image executing at Secure-EL1. In systems where there are
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| /rk3399_ARM-atf/docs/components/spd/ |
| H A D | optee-dispatcher.rst | 4 `OP-TEE OS`_ is a Trusted OS running as Secure EL1.
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| H A D | tlk-dispatcher.rst | 20 TLK is a Trusted OS running as Secure EL1. It is a Free Open Source Software
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| /rk3399_ARM-atf/docs/plat/ |
| H A D | imx8m.rst | 99 causes those locations not to be filled, which in turn causing EL1&0 software 103 data exchange between EL3 and EL1&0 software.
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| /rk3399_ARM-atf/docs/process/ |
| H A D | security.rst | 52 | |TFV-3| | RO memory is always executable at AArch64 Secure EL1 |
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| /rk3399_ARM-atf/docs/plat/nxp/ |
| H A D | nxp-layerscape.rst | 179 + EL1 BL32(Tee OS) | kernel 195 + EL1 fip-ddr BL32(Tee OS) | kernel 219 | Secure EL1 Payload Shared Memory (2 MB) |
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