Home
last modified time | relevance | path

Searched refs:timing (Results 1 – 7 of 7) sorted by relevance

/optee_os/core/drivers/
H A Dimx_ocotp.c226 uint32_t timing = 0; in ocotp_set_timing() local
241 timing = io_read32(g_base_addr + OCOTP_TIMING) & OCOTP_TIMING_WAIT; in ocotp_set_timing()
242 timing = set_field_u32(timing, OCOTP_TIMING_RELAX, relax); in ocotp_set_timing()
243 timing = set_field_u32(timing, OCOTP_TIMING_STROBE_READ, strobe_read); in ocotp_set_timing()
244 timing = set_field_u32(timing, OCOTP_TIMING_STROBE_PROG, strobe_prog); in ocotp_set_timing()
246 io_write32(g_base_addr + OCOTP_TIMING, timing); in ocotp_set_timing()
H A Dstm32_fmc.c384 unsigned long timing = DIV_ROUND_UP(fmc_d->clk_period_ns * 1000, in configure_fmc() local
388 if (timing > 1) { in configure_fmc()
389 timing--; in configure_fmc()
390 if (timing > in configure_fmc()
394 clk_div = SHIFT_U32(timing, in configure_fmc()
H A Dstm32_omm.c280 unsigned long timing = DIV_ROUND_UP(omm_d->req2ack, hclkn) - 1; in stm32_omm_configure() local
282 if (timing > in stm32_omm_configure()
286 req2ack = timing << _OCTOSPIM_CR_REQ2ACK_SHIFT; in stm32_omm_configure()
H A Dstm32_i2c.c395 unsigned long clock_src, uint32_t *timing) in i2c_compute_timing() argument
555 *timing = I2C_SET_TIMINGR_PRESC(s) | in i2c_compute_timing()
565 DMSG("I2C TIMINGR: 0x%"PRIx32, *timing); in i2c_compute_timing()
611 uint32_t *timing) in i2c_setup_timing() argument
629 *timing = hi2c->saved_timing; in i2c_setup_timing()
634 rc = i2c_compute_timing(init, clock_src, timing); in i2c_setup_timing()
659 hi2c->saved_timing = *timing; in i2c_setup_timing()
851 uint32_t timing = 0; in stm32_i2c_init() local
857 rc = i2c_setup_timing(hi2c, init_data, &timing); in stm32_i2c_init()
870 io_write32(base + I2C_TIMINGR, timing & TIMINGR_CLEAR_MASK); in stm32_i2c_init()
/optee_os/lib/libmbedtls/mbedtls/
H A DSECURITY.md29 over the network. This includes observing the content and timing of individual
41 who can measure the timing of packets with sufficient precision. For details
52 The attacker is able to observe the timing of instructions executed by Mbed TLS
57 Mbed TLS provides limited protection against timing attacks. The cost of
58 protecting against timing attacks widely varies depending on the granularity of
64 towards a model of fully timing-invariant code, but has not reached this point
68 physical side channels as well. Remote and physical timing attacks are covered
75 #### Local non-timing side channels
82 Mbed TLS doesn't make any security guarantees against local non-timing-based
83 side channel attacks. If local non-timing attacks are present in a use case or
[all …]
H A DChangeLog17 * Fix a timing side channel in CBC-PKCS7 decryption that could
19 some plaintexts through a timing-based padding oracle attack.
21 * Fix a local timing side-channel in modular inversion and GCD that was
68 the adversary to conduct timing attacks and potentially recover the
103 * Fix a timing side channel in the implementation of PKCS#7 padding
105 ciphertexts to recover the plaintext through a timing oracle attack.
697 * Fix a timing side channel in private key RSA operations. This side channel
700 might have precise enough timing measurements to exploit this. It requires
884 has access to precise timing measurements.
887 timing. (Clang has been seen to do this.) Also introduce assembly
[all …]
/optee_os/lib/libmbedtls/
H A Dsub.mk69 SRCS_CRYPTO += timing.c