1Advisory TFV-9 (CVE-2022-23960) 2============================================================ 3 4+----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+ 5| Title | Trusted Firmware-A exposure to speculative processor | 6| | vulnerabilities with branch prediction target reuse | 7+================+=============================================================+ 8| CVE ID | `CVE-2022-23960`_ | 9+----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+ 10| Date | 08 Mar 2022 | 11+----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+ 12| Versions | All, up to and including v2.6 | 13| Affected | | 14+----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+ 15| Configurations | All | 16| Affected | | 17+----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+ 18| Impact | Potential leakage of secure world data to normal world | 19| | if an attacker is able to find a TF-A exfiltration primitive| 20| | that can be predicted as a valid branch target, and somehow | 21| | induce misprediction onto that primitive. There are | 22| | currently no known exploits. | 23+----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+ 24| Fix Version | `Gerrit topic #spectre_bhb`_ | 25+----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+ 26| Credit | Systems and Network Security Group at Vrije Universiteit | 27| | Amsterdam for CVE-2022-23960, Arm for patches | 28+----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+ 29 30This security advisory describes the current understanding of the Trusted 31Firmware-A exposure to the new speculative processor vulnerability. 32To understand the background and wider impact of these vulnerabilities on Arm 33systems, please refer to the `Arm Processor Security Update`_. The whitepaper 34referred to below describes the Spectre attack and mitigation in more detail 35including implementation specific mitigation details for all impacted Arm CPUs. 36 37 38`CVE-2022-23960`_ 39----------------- 40 41Where possible on vulnerable CPUs that implement FEAT_CSV2, Arm recommends 42inserting a loop workaround with implementation specific number of iterations 43that will discard the branch history on exception entry to a higher exception 44level for the given CPU. This is done as early as possible on entry into EL3, 45before any branch instruction is executed. This is sufficient to mitigate 46Spectre-BHB on behalf of all secure world code, assuming that no secure world 47code is under attacker control. 48 49The below table lists the CPUs that mitigate against this vulnerability in 50TF-A using the loop workaround(all cores that implement FEAT_CSV2 except the 51revisions of Cortex-A73 and Cortex-A75 that implements FEAT_CSV2). 52 53+----------------------+ 54| Core | 55+----------------------+ 56| Cortex-A72(from r1p0)| 57+----------------------+ 58| Cortex-A76 | 59+----------------------+ 60| Cortex-A76AE | 61+----------------------+ 62| Cortex-A77 | 63+----------------------+ 64| Cortex-A78 | 65+----------------------+ 66| Cortex-A78AE | 67+----------------------+ 68| Cortex-A78C | 69+----------------------+ 70| Cortex-X1 | 71+----------------------+ 72| Cortex-X2 | 73+----------------------+ 74| Cortex-A710 | 75+----------------------+ 76| Cortex-Makalu | 77+----------------------+ 78| Cortex-Makalu-ELP | 79+----------------------+ 80| Cortex-Hunter | 81+----------------------+ 82| Neoverse-N1 | 83+----------------------+ 84| Neoverse-N2 | 85+----------------------+ 86| Neoverse-V1 | 87+----------------------+ 88| Neoverse-V2 | 89+----------------------+ 90| Neoverse-Poseidon | 91+----------------------+ 92 93For all other cores impacted by Spectre-BHB, some of which that do not implement 94FEAT_CSV2 and some that do e.g. Cortex-A73, the recommended mitigation is to 95flush all branch predictions via an implementation specific route. 96 97In case local workaround is not feasible, the Rich OS can invoke the SMC 98(``SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3``) to apply the workaround. Refer to `SMCCC Calling 99Convention specification`_ for more details. 100 101`Gerrit topic #spectre_bhb`_ This patchset implements the Spectre-BHB loop 102workaround for CPUs mentioned in the above table. It also mitigates against 103this vulnerability for Cortex-A72 CPU versions that support the CSV2 feature 104(from r1p0). The patch stack also includes an implementation for a specified 105`CVE-2022-23960`_ workaround SMC(``SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3``) for use by normal 106world privileged software. Details of ``SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3`` can be found 107in the `SMCCC Calling Convention specification`_. The specification and 108implementation also enables the normal world to discover the presence of this 109firmware service. This patch also implements ``SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3`` for 110Cortex-A57, Coxtex-A72, Cortex-A73 and Cortex-A75 using the existing workaround. 111for CVE-2017-5715. Cortex-A15 patch extends Spectre V2 mitigation to Spectre-BHB. 112 113The above workaround is enabled by default (on vulnerable CPUs only). Platforms 114can choose to disable them at compile time if they do not require them. 115 116For more information about non-Arm CPUs, please contact the CPU vendor. 117 118.. _Arm Processor Security Update: http://www.arm.com/security-update 119.. _CVE-2022-23960: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-23960 120.. _Gerrit topic #spectre_bhb: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:"spectre_bhb"+(status:open%20OR%20status:merged) 121.. _CVE-2022-23960 mitigation specification: https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability 122.. _SMCCC Calling Convention specification: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0028/latest 123