xref: /optee_os/lib/libutils/ext/include/confine_array_index.h (revision 6b40e452c753ea54c32a5a792bf3788637b137bf)

/* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause */
// Copyright 2019 The Fuchsia Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.

/*
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#ifndef FBL_CONFINE_ARRAY_INDEX_H_
#define FBL_CONFINE_ARRAY_INDEX_H_

#include <stddef.h>

// confine_array_index() bounds-checks and sanitizes an array index safely in the presence of
// speculative execution information leak bugs such as Spectre V1. confine_array_index() always
// returns a sanitized index, even in speculative-path execution.
//
// Callers need to combine confine_array_index with a conventional bounds check; the bounds
// check will return any necessary errors in the nonspeculative path, confine_array_index will
// confine indexes in the speculative path.
//
// Use:
// confine_array_index() returns |index|, if it is < size, or 0 if |index| is >= size.
//
// Example (may leak table1 contents):
//  1: int lookup3(size_t index) {
//  2:   if (index >= table1_size) {
//  3:     return -1;
//  4:   }
//  5:   size_t index2 = table1[index];
//  6:   return table2[index2];
//  7: }
//
// Converted:
//
//  1: int lookup3(size_t index) {
//  2:   if (index >= table1_size) {
//  3:     return -1;
//  4:   }
//  5:   size_t safe_index = confine_array_index(index, table1_size);
//  6:   size_t index2 = table1[safe_index];
//  7:   return table2[index2];
//  8: }
#ifdef __aarch64__
static inline size_t confine_array_index(size_t index, size_t size) {
  size_t safe_index;
  // Use a conditional select and a CSDB barrier to enforce validation of |index|.
  // See "Cache Speculation Side-channels" whitepaper, section "Software Mitigation".
  // "" The combination of both a conditional select/conditional move and the new barrier are
  // sufficient to address this problem on ALL Arm implementations... ""
  asm(
    "cmp %1, %2\n"  // %1 holds the unsanitized index
    "csel %0, %1, xzr, lo\n"  // Select index or zero based on carry (%1 within range)
    "csdb\n"
  : "=r"(safe_index)
  : "r"(index), "r"(size)
  : "cc");
  return safe_index;
}
#endif
#ifdef __x86_64__
static inline size_t confine_array_index(size_t index, size_t size) {
  size_t safe_index = 0;
  // Use a conditional move to enforce validation of |index|.
  // The conditional move has a data dependency on the result of a comparison and cannot
  // execute until the comparison is resolved.
  // See "Software Techniques for Managing Speculation on AMD Processors", Mitigation V1-2.
  // See "Analyzing potential bounds check bypass vulnerabilities", Revision 002,
  //   Section 5.2 Bounds clipping
  __asm__(
    "cmp %1, %2\n"
    "cmova %1, %0\n"  // Select between $0 and |index|
  : "+r"(safe_index)
  : "r"(index), "r"(size)
  : "cc");
  return safe_index;
}
#endif
#endif  // FBL_CONFINE_ARRAY_INDEX_H_