Searched +full:fetch +full:- +full:depth (Results 1 – 3 of 3) sorted by relevance
1 /* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis */2 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: Unlicense */21 (*l)->next = XCALLOC(1, sizeof(ltc_asn1_list)); in s_new_element()22 if ((*l)->next == NULL) { in s_new_element()25 (*l)->next->prev = *l; in s_new_element()26 *l = (*l)->next; in s_new_element()36 @param depth The depth/level of decoding recursion we've already reached39 …ence_flexi(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long *inlen, ltc_asn1_list **out, unsigned long depth) in s_der_decode_sequence_flexi() argument73 if (l->type != LTC_ASN1_EOL) { in s_der_decode_sequence_flexi()74 /* fetch length */ in s_der_decode_sequence_flexi()[all …]
6 group: ci-${{ github.ref }} # unique per branch7 cancel-in-progress: true # cancel previous runs on the same branch11 runs-on: ubuntu-latest14 - name: Checkout17 fetch-depth: 0 # full history so checkpatch can check commit IDs in commit messages18 - name: Update Git config19 run: git config --global --add safe.directory ${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}20 - name: Run checkpatch24 set -e26 mkdir -p /tmp/linux/scripts[all …]
3 = Mbed TLS 3.6.5 branch released 2025-10-1513 mbedtls_cipher_finish(), but makes it easier to process invalid-padding17 * Fix a timing side channel in CBC-PKCS7 decryption that could19 some plaintexts through a timing-based padding oracle attack.20 Credits to Beat Heeb from Oberon microsystems AG. CVE-2025-5943821 * Fix a local timing side-channel in modular inversion and GCD that was24 private key. This can be exploited on some Arm-v9 CPUs by an unprivileged25 attacker running code on the same core (SSBleed), or when Trustzone-M is26 used, by the non-secure side abusing timer interrupts (M-Step), and29 Carlson (National University of Singapore); M-Step: Cristiano Rodrigues[all …]