docs/process/security-hardening.rst

15 Do not leak secrets to the normal world
18 The secure world **must not** leak secrets to the normal world, for example in
24 The secure world **should never** crash or become unusable due to receiving too
25 many normal world requests (a *Denial of Service* or *DoS* attack). It should
26 have a mechanism for throttling or ignoring normal world requests.
28 Preventing Secure-world timing information leakage via PMU counters
31 The Secure world needs to implement some defenses to prevent the Non-secure
32 world from making it leak timing information. In general, higher privilege
39 Timing leakage attacks from the Non-secure world
42 Since the Non-secure world has access to the ``PMCR`` register, it can
45 the Secure world.
70 Since the Non-secure world has fine-grained control over where (at which
73 world. Examples include Spectre, Meltdown, as well as extracting secrets from
77 Secure world mitigation strategies
87 Depending on the implemented features, the Secure world can prohibit counting
96          not be counted in the Secure world.