Lines Matching +full:cts +full:- +full:override

1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
18 .friendly_name = "AES-256-XTS",
26 .friendly_name = "AES-256-CTS-CBC",
27 .cipher_str = "cts(cbc(aes))",
33 .friendly_name = "AES-128-CBC-ESSIV",
41 .friendly_name = "AES-128-CTS-CBC",
42 .cipher_str = "cts(cbc(aes))",
65 if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) in select_encryption_mode()
68 if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) || S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) in select_encryption_mode()
72 inode->i_ino, (inode->i_mode & S_IFMT)); in select_encryption_mode()
73 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); in select_encryption_mode()
84 tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher(mode->cipher_str, 0, 0); in fscrypt_allocate_skcipher()
86 if (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) { in fscrypt_allocate_skcipher()
89 mode->friendly_name, mode->cipher_str); in fscrypt_allocate_skcipher()
90 return ERR_PTR(-ENOPKG); in fscrypt_allocate_skcipher()
93 mode->cipher_str, PTR_ERR(tfm)); in fscrypt_allocate_skcipher()
96 if (!xchg(&mode->logged_impl_name, 1)) { in fscrypt_allocate_skcipher()
100 * performance problems by logging the ->cra_driver_name the in fscrypt_allocate_skcipher()
104 mode->friendly_name, crypto_skcipher_driver_name(tfm)); in fscrypt_allocate_skcipher()
106 if (WARN_ON(crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm) != mode->ivsize)) { in fscrypt_allocate_skcipher()
107 err = -EINVAL; in fscrypt_allocate_skcipher()
111 err = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm, raw_key, mode->keysize); in fscrypt_allocate_skcipher()
123 * Prepare the crypto transform object or blk-crypto key in @prep_key, given the
125 * (fs-layer or blk-crypto) will be used.
137 if (WARN_ON(is_hw_wrapped || raw_key_size != ci->ci_mode->keysize)) in fscrypt_prepare_key()
138 return -EINVAL; in fscrypt_prepare_key()
140 tfm = fscrypt_allocate_skcipher(ci->ci_mode, raw_key, ci->ci_inode); in fscrypt_prepare_key()
145 * I.e., here we publish ->tfm with a RELEASE barrier so that in fscrypt_prepare_key()
147 * possible for per-mode keys, not for per-file keys. in fscrypt_prepare_key()
149 smp_store_release(&prep_key->tfm, tfm); in fscrypt_prepare_key()
153 /* Destroy a crypto transform object and/or blk-crypto key. */
156 crypto_free_skcipher(prep_key->tfm); in fscrypt_destroy_prepared_key()
161 /* Given a per-file encryption key, set up the file's crypto transform object */
164 ci->ci_owns_key = true; in fscrypt_set_per_file_enc_key()
165 return fscrypt_prepare_key(&ci->ci_enc_key, raw_key, in fscrypt_set_per_file_enc_key()
166 ci->ci_mode->keysize, in fscrypt_set_per_file_enc_key()
175 const struct inode *inode = ci->ci_inode; in setup_per_mode_enc_key()
176 const struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb; in setup_per_mode_enc_key()
177 struct fscrypt_mode *mode = ci->ci_mode; in setup_per_mode_enc_key()
178 const u8 mode_num = mode - fscrypt_modes; in setup_per_mode_enc_key()
181 u8 hkdf_info[sizeof(mode_num) + sizeof(sb->s_uuid)]; in setup_per_mode_enc_key()
186 return -EINVAL; in setup_per_mode_enc_key()
190 ci->ci_enc_key = *prep_key; in setup_per_mode_enc_key()
199 if (mk->mk_secret.is_hw_wrapped && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) { in setup_per_mode_enc_key()
203 fscrypt_warn(ci->ci_inode, in setup_per_mode_enc_key()
204 "Hardware-wrapped keys require inline encryption (-o inlinecrypt)"); in setup_per_mode_enc_key()
205 err = -EINVAL; in setup_per_mode_enc_key()
210 fscrypt_warn(ci->ci_inode, in setup_per_mode_enc_key()
211 "Each hardware-wrapped key can only be used with one encryption mode"); in setup_per_mode_enc_key()
212 err = -EINVAL; in setup_per_mode_enc_key()
216 err = fscrypt_prepare_key(prep_key, mk->mk_secret.raw, in setup_per_mode_enc_key()
217 mk->mk_secret.size, true, ci); in setup_per_mode_enc_key()
222 BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(sb->s_uuid) != 16); in setup_per_mode_enc_key()
226 memcpy(&hkdf_info[hkdf_infolen], &sb->s_uuid, in setup_per_mode_enc_key()
227 sizeof(sb->s_uuid)); in setup_per_mode_enc_key()
228 hkdf_infolen += sizeof(sb->s_uuid); in setup_per_mode_enc_key()
230 err = fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&mk->mk_secret.hkdf, in setup_per_mode_enc_key()
232 mode_key, mode->keysize); in setup_per_mode_enc_key()
235 err = fscrypt_prepare_key(prep_key, mode_key, mode->keysize, in setup_per_mode_enc_key()
237 memzero_explicit(mode_key, mode->keysize); in setup_per_mode_enc_key()
242 ci->ci_enc_key = *prep_key; in setup_per_mode_enc_key()
251 * application-specific information string.
254 * as a pair of 64-bit words. Therefore, on big endian CPUs we have to do an
263 err = fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&mk->mk_secret.hkdf, context, info, infolen, in fscrypt_derive_siphash_key()
269 BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(key->key) != 2); in fscrypt_derive_siphash_key()
270 le64_to_cpus(&key->key[0]); in fscrypt_derive_siphash_key()
271 le64_to_cpus(&key->key[1]); in fscrypt_derive_siphash_key()
281 ci->ci_nonce, FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE, in fscrypt_derive_dirhash_key()
282 &ci->ci_dirhash_key); in fscrypt_derive_dirhash_key()
285 ci->ci_dirhash_key_initialized = true; in fscrypt_derive_dirhash_key()
292 WARN_ON(ci->ci_inode->i_ino == 0); in fscrypt_hash_inode_number()
293 WARN_ON(!mk->mk_ino_hash_key_initialized); in fscrypt_hash_inode_number()
295 ci->ci_hashed_ino = (u32)siphash_1u64(ci->ci_inode->i_ino, in fscrypt_hash_inode_number()
296 &mk->mk_ino_hash_key); in fscrypt_hash_inode_number()
304 err = setup_per_mode_enc_key(ci, mk, mk->mk_iv_ino_lblk_32_keys, in fscrypt_setup_iv_ino_lblk_32_key()
310 if (!smp_load_acquire(&mk->mk_ino_hash_key_initialized)) { in fscrypt_setup_iv_ino_lblk_32_key()
314 if (mk->mk_ino_hash_key_initialized) in fscrypt_setup_iv_ino_lblk_32_key()
319 NULL, 0, &mk->mk_ino_hash_key); in fscrypt_setup_iv_ino_lblk_32_key()
323 smp_store_release(&mk->mk_ino_hash_key_initialized, true); in fscrypt_setup_iv_ino_lblk_32_key()
334 if (ci->ci_inode->i_ino) in fscrypt_setup_iv_ino_lblk_32_key()
345 if (mk->mk_secret.is_hw_wrapped && in fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key()
346 !(ci->ci_policy.v2.flags & (FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64 | in fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key()
348 fscrypt_warn(ci->ci_inode, in fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key()
349 "Hardware-wrapped keys are only supported with IV_INO_LBLK policies"); in fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key()
350 return -EINVAL; in fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key()
353 if (ci->ci_policy.v2.flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY) { in fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key()
355 * DIRECT_KEY: instead of deriving per-file encryption keys, the in fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key()
356 * per-file nonce will be included in all the IVs. But unlike in fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key()
358 * with the master key directly but rather derive a per-mode in fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key()
362 err = setup_per_mode_enc_key(ci, mk, mk->mk_direct_keys, in fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key()
364 } else if (ci->ci_policy.v2.flags & in fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key()
372 err = setup_per_mode_enc_key(ci, mk, mk->mk_iv_ino_lblk_64_keys, in fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key()
375 } else if (ci->ci_policy.v2.flags & in fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key()
381 err = fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&mk->mk_secret.hkdf, in fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key()
383 ci->ci_nonce, FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE, in fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key()
384 derived_key, ci->ci_mode->keysize); in fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key()
389 memzero_explicit(derived_key, ci->ci_mode->keysize); in fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key()
414 * (but in practice we only need to consider @ci->ci_mode, since any other
416 * required key size over @ci->ci_mode). This allows AES-256-XTS keys to be
417 * derived from a 256-bit master key, which is cryptographically sufficient,
418 * rather than requiring a 512-bit master key which is unnecessarily long. (We
419 * still allow 512-bit master keys if the user chooses to use them, though.)
426 if (ci->ci_policy.version == FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1) in fscrypt_valid_master_key_size()
427 min_keysize = ci->ci_mode->keysize; in fscrypt_valid_master_key_size()
429 min_keysize = ci->ci_mode->security_strength; in fscrypt_valid_master_key_size()
431 if (mk->mk_secret.size < min_keysize) { in fscrypt_valid_master_key_size()
434 master_key_spec_type(&mk->mk_spec), in fscrypt_valid_master_key_size()
435 master_key_spec_len(&mk->mk_spec), in fscrypt_valid_master_key_size()
436 (u8 *)&mk->mk_spec.u, in fscrypt_valid_master_key_size()
437 mk->mk_secret.size, min_keysize); in fscrypt_valid_master_key_size()
446 * If the master key is found in the filesystem-level keyring, then it is
447 * returned in *mk_ret with its semaphore read-locked. This is needed to ensure
448 * that only one task links the fscrypt_info into ->mk_decrypted_inodes (as
460 switch (ci->ci_policy.version) { in setup_file_encryption_key()
464 ci->ci_policy.v1.master_key_descriptor, in setup_file_encryption_key()
470 ci->ci_policy.v2.master_key_identifier, in setup_file_encryption_key()
475 return -EINVAL; in setup_file_encryption_key()
478 mk = fscrypt_find_master_key(ci->ci_inode->i_sb, &mk_spec); in setup_file_encryption_key()
480 if (ci->ci_policy.version != FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1) in setup_file_encryption_key()
481 return -ENOKEY; in setup_file_encryption_key()
490 * to before the search of ->s_master_keys, since users in setup_file_encryption_key()
491 * shouldn't be able to override filesystem-level keys. in setup_file_encryption_key()
495 down_read(&mk->mk_sem); in setup_file_encryption_key()
498 if (!is_master_key_secret_present(&mk->mk_secret)) { in setup_file_encryption_key()
499 err = -ENOKEY; in setup_file_encryption_key()
504 err = -ENOKEY; in setup_file_encryption_key()
508 err = fscrypt_select_encryption_impl(ci, mk->mk_secret.is_hw_wrapped); in setup_file_encryption_key()
512 switch (ci->ci_policy.version) { in setup_file_encryption_key()
514 err = fscrypt_setup_v1_file_key(ci, mk->mk_secret.raw); in setup_file_encryption_key()
521 err = -EINVAL; in setup_file_encryption_key()
531 up_read(&mk->mk_sem); in setup_file_encryption_key()
543 if (ci->ci_direct_key) in put_crypt_info()
544 fscrypt_put_direct_key(ci->ci_direct_key); in put_crypt_info()
545 else if (ci->ci_owns_key) in put_crypt_info()
546 fscrypt_destroy_prepared_key(&ci->ci_enc_key); in put_crypt_info()
548 mk = ci->ci_master_key; in put_crypt_info()
556 spin_lock(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock); in put_crypt_info()
557 list_del(&ci->ci_master_key_link); in put_crypt_info()
558 spin_unlock(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock); in put_crypt_info()
576 res = fscrypt_initialize(inode->i_sb->s_cop->flags); in fscrypt_setup_encryption_info()
582 return -ENOMEM; in fscrypt_setup_encryption_info()
584 crypt_info->ci_inode = inode; in fscrypt_setup_encryption_info()
585 crypt_info->ci_policy = *policy; in fscrypt_setup_encryption_info()
586 memcpy(crypt_info->ci_nonce, nonce, FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE); in fscrypt_setup_encryption_info()
588 mode = select_encryption_mode(&crypt_info->ci_policy, inode); in fscrypt_setup_encryption_info()
593 WARN_ON(mode->ivsize > FSCRYPT_MAX_IV_SIZE); in fscrypt_setup_encryption_info()
594 crypt_info->ci_mode = mode; in fscrypt_setup_encryption_info()
601 * For existing inodes, multiple tasks may race to set ->i_crypt_info. in fscrypt_setup_encryption_info()
603 * fscrypt_get_info(). I.e., here we publish ->i_crypt_info with a in fscrypt_setup_encryption_info()
606 if (cmpxchg_release(&inode->i_crypt_info, NULL, crypt_info) == NULL) { in fscrypt_setup_encryption_info()
608 * We won the race and set ->i_crypt_info to our crypt_info. in fscrypt_setup_encryption_info()
612 crypt_info->ci_master_key = mk; in fscrypt_setup_encryption_info()
613 refcount_inc(&mk->mk_active_refs); in fscrypt_setup_encryption_info()
614 spin_lock(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock); in fscrypt_setup_encryption_info()
615 list_add(&crypt_info->ci_master_key_link, in fscrypt_setup_encryption_info()
616 &mk->mk_decrypted_inodes); in fscrypt_setup_encryption_info()
617 spin_unlock(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock); in fscrypt_setup_encryption_info()
624 up_read(&mk->mk_sem); in fscrypt_setup_encryption_info()
632 * fscrypt_get_encryption_info() - set up an inode's encryption key
640 * Set up ->i_crypt_info, if it hasn't already been done.
642 * Note: unless ->i_crypt_info is already set, this isn't %GFP_NOFS-safe. So
645 * Return: 0 if ->i_crypt_info was set or was already set, *or* if the
647 * distinguish these cases.) Also can return another -errno code.
658 res = inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx)); in fscrypt_get_encryption_info()
660 if (res == -ERANGE && allow_unsupported) in fscrypt_get_encryption_info()
678 return -EINVAL; in fscrypt_get_encryption_info()
684 S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)); in fscrypt_get_encryption_info()
686 if (res == -ENOPKG && allow_unsupported) /* Algorithm unavailable? */ in fscrypt_get_encryption_info()
688 if (res == -ENOKEY) in fscrypt_get_encryption_info()
694 * fscrypt_prepare_new_inode() - prepare to create a new inode in a directory
695 * @dir: a possibly-encrypted directory
696 * @inode: the new inode. ->i_mode must be set already.
697 * ->i_ino doesn't need to be set yet.
700 * If the directory is encrypted, set up its ->i_crypt_info in preparation for
702 * encrypted, set up its ->i_crypt_info and set *encrypt_ret=true.
704 * This isn't %GFP_NOFS-safe, and therefore it should be called before starting
705 * any filesystem transaction to create the inode. For this reason, ->i_ino
711 * Return: 0 on success, -ENOKEY if the encryption key is missing, or another
712 * -errno code
726 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(inode->i_mode == 0)) in fscrypt_prepare_new_inode()
727 return -EINVAL; in fscrypt_prepare_new_inode()
733 if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && in fscrypt_prepare_new_inode()
734 !S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) && in fscrypt_prepare_new_inode()
735 !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) in fscrypt_prepare_new_inode()
743 S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)); in fscrypt_prepare_new_inode()
748 * fscrypt_put_encryption_info() - free most of an inode's fscrypt data
756 put_crypt_info(inode->i_crypt_info); in fscrypt_put_encryption_info()
757 inode->i_crypt_info = NULL; in fscrypt_put_encryption_info()
762 * fscrypt_free_inode() - free an inode's fscrypt data requiring RCU delay
770 if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) && S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) { in fscrypt_free_inode()
771 kfree(inode->i_link); in fscrypt_free_inode()
772 inode->i_link = NULL; in fscrypt_free_inode()
778 * fscrypt_drop_inode() - check whether the inode's master key has been removed
781 * Filesystems supporting fscrypt must call this from their ->drop_inode()
794 * was provided via the legacy mechanism of the process-subscribed in fscrypt_drop_inode()
797 if (!ci || !ci->ci_master_key) in fscrypt_drop_inode()
801 * With proper, non-racy use of FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY, all inodes in fscrypt_drop_inode()
806 if (inode->i_state & I_DIRTY_ALL) in fscrypt_drop_inode()
817 return !is_master_key_secret_present(&ci->ci_master_key->mk_secret); in fscrypt_drop_inode()